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Abstract. Autonomous agents require trust and reputation concepts in
order to identify communities of agents with which to interact reliably in
ways analogous to humans. Agent societies are invariably heterogeneous,
with multiple decision making policies and actions governing their be-
haviour. Through the introduction of naive agents, this paper shows em-
pirically that while learning agents can identify malicious agents through
direct interaction, naive agents compromise utility through their inabil-
ity to discern malicious agents. Moreover, the impact of the proportion
of naive agents on the society is analyzed. The paper demonstrates that
there is a need for witness interaction trust to detect naive agents in addi-
tion to the need for direct interaction trust to detect malicious agents. By
proposing a set of policies, the paper demonstrates how learning agents
can isolate themselves from naive and malicious agents.
1 Introduction
The concept of trust is crucial in driving decision making and relationships
in human and artificial societies. According to Jarvenpaa et al.[5], trust is an
essential aspect of any relationship in which the trustor has no control over the
actions of a trustee, the decision is important, and the environment is uncertain.
Agents make use of trust and reputation models in deciding how, when and
who to interact with in a specific context [7]. Stated another way, an agent must
be able to model trustworthiness of potential interaction partners and make
decisions based on that model. It is a commonly held position that the main
utility of trust and reputation models is minimizing the risk of interacting with
others by avoiding interacting with malicious agents. With this view in mind,
the principal objective of such models is the detection of untrustworthy agents.
The majority of computational trust and reputation models are designed and
evaluated based on the assumption that the agent society only comprises two
types of agents: trust-aware and malicious. It is our view that an agent society
should include another type of agent called a naive agent. Naive agents are naive
in terms of deciding how, when and who to interact with while always cooper-
ating with other agents. The effects of naive agents on trust-aware individuals
and the whole of society have not been analyzed to date. This observation mo-
tivates the work reported in this paper. Agents types represented in this paper
have extremely limited cognitive properties modeled with simple policies. This
is deliberate as we wish to understand the importance of agent heterogeneity in
societal dynamics. Our research goal is the understanding of self-organization of
agents into trusted communities.
This paper makes the following contributions: the introduction of the concept
of a naive agent; analyzing the impact of this agent class on agent societies using
a game-theoretic model on a simulation platform, and a strategy proposal for
trust-aware agents to deal with them. While ART [3] aims to provide a unified
platform for trust model evaluation it does not consider variables that are central
to the evaluation proposed in this paper. Therefore, in order to evaluate our
model, we design our own testbed which is described in Section 4.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. After describing related
work in Section 2, we discuss naive agents and the environment model of agents in
Sections 3 and 4 respectively. We describe the proposed agent model in Section 5,
and experiments in Section 6. Finally, conclusions and future work are explained
in Section 7.
2 Related Work
The body of research on trust and reputation models is substantial; a review
of which can be found in [7] and [9]. In this paper our discussion is limited to
models that incorporate, or discuss, multiple information sources.
Regret [8] is a decentralized trust and reputation system which takes into
account three different sources of information. The direct trust, witness reputa-
tion, neighborhood reputation and, system reputation are introduced in Regret.
Except for the direct trust module, the rest of the model is not readily applicable
here because it is unclear how each agent can build the social network.
Yu and Singh proposed a social reputation management system in which
they represented an agent’s trust ratings regarding another agent as a scalar
and combined them with testimonies [14]. Yu et al. have proposed the trust
model in large-scale peer-to-peer systems in which each peer has its own a set
of acquaintances [13]. The acquaintance’s reliability and credibility are included
in this model but are not used to drive the selection of new acquaintances as
proposed here. However, the trust model strongly influenced the model described
in Section 5.
Huynh et al. introduce a trust and reputation model called FIRE that in-
tegrates a number of information sources to estimate the trustworthiness of an
agent [4]. Specifically, FIRE incorporates interaction trust, role-based trust, wit-
ness reputation, and certified reputation to provide a trust metric. FIRE does
not consider malicious witness providers because it assumes honest agent infor-
mation exchange. The research reported here explicitly deals with inaccurate
witness providers.
In the Social Interaction Framework (SIF) [11], agents are playing a Pris-
oner’s dilemma set of games with a partner selection phase. Each agent receives
the results of the game it has played plus the information about the games played
by a subset of all players. An agent evaluates the reputation of another agent
based on observations as well through other witnesses. However, SIF does not
describe how to find witnesses, which the model reported here does.
There are few trust models which consider the existence of an adversary in
providing witness information and present solutions for dealing with inaccurate
reputation, essentially the problem of naive agents of interest here. TRAVOS
[12] models an agent’s trust in an interaction partner. Trust is calculated using
probability theory that takes account of past interactions and reputation infor-
mation gathered from third parties while coping with inaccurate reputations. Yu
and Singh [15] is similar to TRAVOS, in that it rates opinion source accuracy
based on a subset of observations of trustee behavior.
Most recently, Salehi-Abari and White [10] have empirically shown that ex-
ploitation resistance is important for trust and reputation models. They declared
that exploitation resistance “implies that adversaries cannot take advantage of
the trust model and its associated systems parameters even when they are known
or partially known to adversaries.”
3 Naive Agent
We define a naive agent in the following way: a naive agent is incapable of
properly deciding how, when and with whom to interact. As such, it fails to
detect and stop interacting with untrustworthy agents due to its inability to
properly assess other agents. Such agents are optimistic; they consider all other
agents to be completely trustworthy and always cooperate with every member
of the society. Naive agents usually do not have any malicious intention.
Examples of naive agent can be seen in many places. On eBay, sellers receive
feedback (+1, 0, -1) in each auction and their reputation is calculated as the
sum of those ratings over the last six months. It has been observed that there
are many users (buyers) who do not receive satisfactory goods or services but
they rate the sellers highly and even continue interacting with them. In other
words they fail to “complain”. We see these users as naive users.
4 Environment Model
The majority of open distributed computer systems can be modeled as multi-
agent systems (MAS) in which each agent acts autonomously to achieve its
objectives. Autonomy is represented here by the evaluation of pre-determined
policies that cause changes in agent trust and reputation models and subsequent
changes in societal structure. Our model incorporates heterogeneous agents in-
teracting in a game theoretic manner. The model is described in the following 3
subsections.
4.1 Interactions
An agent interacts with a subset of all agents. Two agents are neighbors if both
accept each other as a neighbor and interact with one another continuously.
An agent maintains the neighborhood set which is dynamic, changing when an
agent is determined to be untrustworthy or new agent interactions are required.
Agents have bounded sociability as determined by the maximal cardinality of the
neighborhood set. Agents can have two types of interactions with their neighbors:
Direct Interaction and Witness Interaction.
Direct Interaction. Direct interaction is the most frequently used source of
information for trust and reputation models [9, 7]. Different fields have their own
interpretation of direct interaction. For example, in e-commerce, direct interac-
tion might be considered to be buying or selling a product.
Witness Interaction. An agent can ask for an assessment of the trustworthi-
ness of a specific agent from its neighbors and then the neighbors send their
ratings of that agent to the asking agent. We call this asking for an opinion and
receiving a rating, a Witness Interaction .
4.2 Games: IPD and GPD
Direct and witness interactions are modeled using two extensions of the Pris-
oner’s Dilemma. The Prisoner’s Dilemma is a non-zero-sum, non-cooperative,
and simultaneous game in which two players may each “cooperate” with or “de-
fect” from the other player. In the iterated prisoner’s dilemma (IPD) [1], the
game is played repeatedly. As a result, players have the opportunity to “punish”
each other for previous uncooperative play. The IPD is closely related to the
evolution of trust because if both players trust each other they can both coop-
erate and avoid mutual defection. We have modeled the direct interaction using
IPD1.
Witness Interaction is modeled by the Generalized Prisoner’s Dilemma (GPD).
GPD is a two-person game which specifies the general forms for an asymmetric
payoff matrix that preserves the social dilemma [2]. GPD is compatible with
client/server structure where one player is the client and the other one is the
server in each game. The decision of the server alone determines the ultimate
outcome of the interaction.
4.3 Cooperation and Defection
We define two kinds of Cooperation and Defection in our environment:
(1) Cooperation/Defection in Direct Interaction (CDI/DDI) and (2) Cooper-
ation/Defection in Witness Interaction (CWI/DWI).
CDI/DDI have different interpretations depending on the context. For exam-
ple, in e-commerce, defection in an interaction can be interpreted as the agent
not satisfying the terms of a contract, selling poor quality goods, delivering late,
or failing to pay the requested amount of money to a seller [7]. CWI means
that the witness agent provides a reliable rating for the asking agent regarding
the queried agent. In contrast, DWI means that the witness agent provides an
unreliable rating for the asker agent regarding the queried agent.
5 Agent Model
This section presents two types of trust variables that assist agents in deter-
mining with whom they should interact. Furthermore, three policy types will be
presented: direct interaction policy, witness interaction policy, and connection
policy which assist agents in deciding how and when they should interact with
another agent.
1 Our work is different from the well-known trust game appeared in the game theory
literature.
5.1 Trust Variables
Based on the aforementioned cooperation/defection explained in section 4.3, two
modeled dimensions of trust are proposed. The motivation for having two trust
variables is that we believe trustworthiness has different independent dimensions.
For instance, an agent who is trustworthy in a direct interaction is not necessarily
trustworthy in a witness interaction.
Each trust variable is defined by Ti,j(t) indicating the trust rating assigned
by agent i to agent j after t interactions between agent i and agent j, with
Ti,j(t) ∈ [−1,+1] and Ti,j(0) = 0. One agent in the view of the other agent can
have one of the following levels of trustworthiness: Trustworthy, Not Yet Known,
or Untrustworthy. Following Marsh [6], we define an upper and a lower threshold
for each agent to model different levels of trustworthiness. The agent i has its
own upper threshold −1 ≤ ωi ≤ 1 and lower threshold −1 ≤ Ωi ≤ 1. Agent j is
Trustworthy from the viewpoint of agent i after t times of interactions if and only
if Ti,j(t) ≥ ωi. Agent i sees agent j as an Untrustworthy agent if Ti,j(t) ≤ Ωi
and if Ωi < Ti,j(t) < ωi then the agent j is in the state Not Yet Known.
Direct Interaction Trust (DIT). Direct Interaction Trust (DIT) is the
result of CDI/DDI. Each agent maintains DITi,j(t) variables for the agents with
which they have had direct interactions. We used the following trust updating
scheme motivated by that described in [14]:
DITi,j(t+ 1) =

DITi,j(t) + αD(i)(1−DITi,j(t)) DITi,j(t) > 0 , CDI
(DITi,j(t) + αD(i))/(1−min(|DITi,j(t))| , |αD(i)|) DITi,j(t) < 0 , CDI
(DITi,j(t) + βD(i))/(1−min(|DITi,j(t))| , |βD(i)|) DITi,j(t) > 0 , DDI
DITi,j(t) + βD(i)(1 +DITi,j(t)) DITi,j(t) < 0 , DDI
Where αD(i) > 0 and βD(i) < 0 are positive evidence and negative evidence
weighting coefficients respectively for updating of the direct interaction trust
variable of agent i. The value of DITi,j(t), ω
DIT
i and Ω
DIT
i determine that the
agent j is either trustworthy, Not Yet Known or Untrustworthy in terms of direct
interaction from the perspective of agent i.
Witness Interaction Trust (WIT). Witness Interaction Trust (WIT) is
the result of the cooperation/defection that the neighbors of an agent have
with the agent regarding witness interaction (CWI/DWI). Agent i maintains
a WITi,j(t) variable for the agent j from whom it has received witness infor-
mation. The updating scheme of WITi,j(t) is similar to the one presented for
DITi,j(t) but CDI and DDI should be replaced by CWI and DWI respectively
and αD(i) > 0 and βD(i) < 0 is replaced with αW (i) > 0 and βW (i) < 0 re-
spectively. Where αW (i) > 0 and βW (i) < 0 are positive evidence and negative
evidence weighting coefficients respectively for updating of the witness interac-
tion trust variable of agent i. The value ofWITi,j(t), ω
WIT
i and Ω
WIT
i determine
that the agent j is either Trustworthy, Not Yet Known or Untrustworthy in terms
of witness interaction from the perspective of agent i.
5.2 Agent Policy Types
The perceptions introduced above allow agents to determine the trustworthiness
of other agents. Policies make use of agent perceptions, trust and reputation
models in order to decide upon the set of agents with which they will interact
and in what ways they will interact. Policies may cause the agent interaction
neighborhood to change, for example. While the testbed is extensible, several
policy classes have been defined for the research reported here; they are explained
in the following subsections.
Direct Interaction Policy (DIP). This type of policy assists an agent in
making decisions regarding its direct interactions.
Witness Interaction Policy (WIP). This type of policy assists an agent
in making two categories of decisions related to its witness interactions. First,
agents need to decide how to provide the witness information for another agent
on receiving a witness request. Should they manipulate the real information and
forward false witness information to the requester (an example of defection) or
should they tell the truth? The second decision is related to when and from
whom the agent should ask for witness information.
We defined two sub witness interaction policies: Answering policy (AP) and
Querying policy (QP). The former covers the first category of decisions men-
tioned above while the latter is for the second category.
Connection Policy (CP). This policy type assists an agent in making decisions
regarding whether it should make a request for connection to other agents and
whether the agents should accept/reject a request for a connection.
Disconnection Policy (DP). DP aids an agent in deciding whether it should
drop a connection to a neighbor or not.
5.3 Experimentally Evaluated Policies
This section described policies that were evaluated experimentally.
Direct Interaction Policies. Three kinds of DIPs used in our experiments
are: Always Cooperate (AC), Always-Defect (AD), and Trust-based Tit-For-Tat
(TTFT). Agents using the AC policy for their direct interactions will cooper-
ate with their neighbors in direct interactions regardless of the action of their
neighbor. In contrast, agents using the AD policy will defect in all neighbor in-
teractions. Agents employing TTFT will start with cooperation and then imitate
the neighbors’ last move as long as the neighbors are neither trustworthy nor
untrustworthy. If a neighbor is known as untrustworthy, the agent will defect
and if a neighbor is known as trustworthy, the agent will cooperate with it.
Connection Policies. Three kinds of connection polices are used in our exper-
iments: Conservative (C), Naive (N), and Greedy (G). Each of these policies has
a property called the Socializing Tendency (ST). ST affects decisions for making
a connection request and the acceptance of the connection request. All three
connection policies use Algorithm 1 with different ST values.
According to Algorithm 1, any connection request from another agent will be
accepted regardless of the value of ST but the agent will acquire unvisited agent
IDs if its number of neighbors is less than ST. In our experiments the value of
ST is 5, 15, and 100 for Conservative, Naive, and Greedy connection policies
respectively. The motivation for these values is that malicious agents will tend
to be greedy and try and exploit a large number of agents; trust-aware agents,
like their human counterparts, will tend to have a small circle of trusted agents.
Algorithm 1 Connection Policies
{CRQ is a queue containing the connection requests}
if CRQ is not empty then
j = dequeue(CRQ)
connectTo(j)
end if
if size(neighborhood) < ST then
j = get unvisited agent from list of all known agents
if ∃j 6= null then
requestConnectionTo(j)
end if
end if
Witness Interaction Policies. Three kinds of answering policies are modeled:
Honest (Ho), Liar (Li), and Simpleton (Si). All these sub-policies use the pseudo-
code presented in Algorithm 2 while differentiating in the assignment of opinion
variable (refer to * in Algorithm 2). The asterisk should be replaced byDITi,j(t),
“−1∗DITi,j(t)”, or 1 for Honest, Liar, or Simpleton policy respectively. An agent
employing the Liar policy gives manipulated ratings to other agents by giving
high ratings for untrustworthy agents and low ratings for trustworthy ones. The
Simpleton policy ranks all other agents as trustworthy but the Honest policy
always tells the truth to everyone. CWI/DWI will be sent based on whether
the forwarding opinion agrees with the internal trust value of an agent or not.
If the difference between them is less than the Discrimination Threshold (DT),
an agent will send CWI otherwise DWI is sent. We can therefore say that:
Liar always defects, Honest always cooperates, and Simpleton sometimes defects
(by rating high untrustworthy agents) and sometimes cooperates (by rating low
trustworthy agents) in providing the witness information. In the experiments
reported here DT is set to 0.25.
Algorithm 2 Answering Policy
if receiving a witness request about j from k then
opinion = ∗
send opinion to k
if |opinion − DITi,j(t)| < DT then
Send CWI to k after TW time steps
else
Send DWI to k after TW time steps
end if
end if
By use of the querying policy presented in Algorithm 3, the agent asks for
witness information from its neighbors regarding one of the untrustworthy agents
which has already interacted with the given agent. As a result, the agent can
understand which neighbors are capable of detecting untrustworthy agents.
Disconnection Policies. We have experimentally evaluated three kinds of dis-
connection policies: Lenient (Le), Moderate (Mo), and Strict (St). An agent will
Algorithm 3 Querying Policy
{BlackList: a list of known untrustworthy agents in terms of direct interactions}
if BlackList is not empty then
j = select randomly j from BlackList
Ask for witness information about j from all neighbors
end if
never drop a connection when using the Lenient policy. An agent that uses the
Moderate policy will disconnect from the neighbor known as an untrustworthy
agent in terms of direct interaction. An agent employing the Strict connection
policy disconnects from the neighbor which is known to be untrustworthy either
in direct interactions or in witness interactions.
6 Experiments
We have empirically analyzed our agent types at both microscopic and macro-
scopic levels. On the macro level, we studied how society structure changes over
the course of many interactions. On the micro level, the utility of agents is ex-
amined. UAT (i), the average of utilities for agents with the type of AT at time
step i, is calculated by: UAT (i) =
∑
a∈AT
UAvg(a,i)
NAT
, where UAvg(a, i) is the aver-
age of utility of agent a over its interactions at time step i and NAT is the total
number of agents in the society whose type is AT . The utility of each interaction
is calculated as follows: If agent i defects and agent j cooperates, agent i gets
the Temptation to Defect payoff of 5 points while agent j receives the Sucker’s
payoff of 0. If both cooperate each gets the Reward for Mutual Cooperation
payoff of 3 points, while if both defect each gets the Punishment for Mutual
Defection payoff of 1 point. We have used the agent types presented in Table 1
for all experiments. In this paper, we use the same experimental values for our
trust models as used by Yu and Singh in [14].
Name Naive Malicious Trust-Aware(TA) Trust-Aware+(TA+)
Trust - - DIT DIT&WIT
DIP AC AD TTFT TTFT
CP N G C C
DP Le Le Mo St
AP Si Li Ho Ho
QP - - - QP
Table 1. Agent Types and Specifications
Experiment 1. We run the simulation with the population size of 200 agents
where TA agents cover 66% of population and the rest are Malicious agents.
The objective of this experiment is to understand whether cooperation emerges
between TA agents while they isolate themselves from Malicious agents.
Different stages of this simulation are depicted in Figure 1, where TA agents
and Malicious agents are in green (light gray in white-black print) and in black
respectively. Starting from an initially unconnected society (Figure 1a) Malicious
agents are quickly discovered (Figure 1c) and are completely isolated by time
step 400 (Figure 1f).
(a) Time Step 1 (b) Time Step 20 (c) Time Step 60
(d) Time Step 180 (e) Time Step 340 (f) Time Step 400
Fig. 1. Structural changes of Agents Society in Experiment 1
Experiment 2. We run 200 agents where 55%, 11% and 34% of population
are TA, Naive and Malicious agents respectively. The structure of the agent
society after 400 time steps is presented in Figure 2a. Malicious and Trust-
Aware agents are shown with the same colors of the previous experiment and
blue squares with white “+” represent Naive agents. With the introduction of
Naive agents, we could not achieve separation of Malicious and TA agents seen
in Experiment 1. Since TA agents perceived Naive agents as trustworthy agents
in direct interaction so they maintain their connections with Naive agents. On
the other hand, since Naive agents accept all connection requests and do not
drop any connections, they will be exploited by Malicious agents. As illustrated
in Figure 2a, TA agents are connected indirectly to Malicious agents by means
of Naive agents. Figure 2b shows Naive agents acting a buffer between the 2
other agent communities for a 30 agent simulation.
(a) 200 Agents (b) 30 Agents
Fig. 2. The Final Society Structure in Exp. 2
Figure 3 shows the U of each agent type over the course of the simulation.
UTA increases over the simulation with small fluctuations. The more UTA gets
close to 3, the higher the proportion of interactions of TA agents are mutual
cooperation. UMalicious is increasing due to connecting to more Naive agents.
The UNaive drops over the course of simulation since the number of their connec-
tions with Malicious agents increases. All three graphs stabilize before time step
350, which is the result of not establishing new connections by any agents. Not
requesting any connections can be the result of reaching the ST threshold (e.g.,
Naive and Trust-Aware) or scanning all of the agents (e.g., Malicious agents).
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Experiment 3. This experiment intends to show the effect of a varying
proportion of Naive agents. We have run five simulations of 200 agents with dif-
ferent proportions of Naive and Trust-Aware agents while maintaining Malicious
agents unchanged as shown in Table 2.
Agent Type Population
Pop1 Pop2 Pop3 Pop4 Pop5
Malicious 34% 34% 34% 34% 34%
Naive 0% 11% 22% 33% 44%
Trust-Aware 66% 55% 44% 33% 22%
Table 2. Population Distributions of Experiment 3
Figure 4 presents U of each agent type at time step 400 for each of the runs.
By increasing the proportion of Naive agents, UMalicious increases considerably
although the proportion of Malicious agents is unchanged. UTA in all runs stays
at 3 indicating that the proportion of Naive agents does not influence UTA.
UNaive increases slightly because Malicious agents have more choices to con-
nect to Naive agents and to satisfy their ST threshold. For Pop5, the UMalicious
exceeds that of TA agents. In such societies, where malicious agents are un-
bounded in terms of their ability to exploit other agents,there is no incentive to
be a Trust-aware agent since Malicious agents have better utility. That is all the
outcome of having a high proportion of Naive agents in the society.
Experiment 4. We run 200 agents where 55%, 11% and 34% of the pop-
ulation are Trust-Aware+ (TA+), Naive and Malicious agents respectively. The
structure of the agent society at three points in the simulation are presented in
Figure 5. Malicious and Naive agents are shown with the same colors of pre-
vious experiments and TA+ agents are presented in green. It is interesting to
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Fig. 4. U for five runs of Exp. 3
observe that Naive and Malicious agents are isolated from the TA+ agents. By
using multi-dimensional trust (DIT and WIT) and the Strict disconnecting pol-
icy, TA+ agents could identify both Malicious and Naive agents to isolate them
from their community. Naive agents are detected based on their failure to pro-
vide the appropriate witness information while Malicious agents are recognized
by their defections in direct interactions.
(a) Time Step 1 (b) Time Step 180 (c) Time Step 400
Fig. 5. Structural changes of Agents Society in Experiment 4.
7 Conclusion and Future Work
The isolation of untrustworthy agents from a society of agents is considered
one of the main objectives of trust models [14]. Experiment 1 demonstrates that
malicious agents can be isolated using DIT when naive agents are absent. Exper-
iments 2 and 3 demonstrate how the proportion of naive agents affects the utility
of malicious agents and society structure. When this proportion exceeds some
threshold, malicious agents have the best utility in the society and consequently
there is no incentive for trust-aware agents to stay trustworthy. In contrast, they
are motivated to be malicious to exploit naive agents too. As shown in experi-
ment 3, it is important for a society to limit the ability of any agent to exploit
another agent. Experiment 4 shows how adding WIT allows naive agents to be
detected. In this sense, TA+ agents assessed the ability of their neighbors in
detecting malicious agents. Those agents which fail in this assessment turn out
to be naive agents.
Naive agents strongly degrade the value of DIT in trust-aware agent societies.
Our results demonstrate that naive agents help malicious agents survive by co-
operating with them directly (by providing good services) and indirectly (by
giving a good rating for them). The proposed model demonstrates that trust-
aware agents need multi-dimensional trust models to separate malicious and
naive agents from the trustworthy community and would benefit from maintain-
ing networks for each dimension of trust.
We plan to extend the proposed trust model for other sources of information
such as observed interactions and modeling agents that are naive in observing
the results of interaction. It would be interesting to see the effect of naive agents
in reputation variable (systems) where the ratings regarding the specific agents
will be gathered from naive neighbors.
References
1. Robert Axelrod. The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books, 1984.
2. Michal Feldman, Kevin Lai, Ion Stoica, and John Chuang. Robust incentive tech-
niques for peer-to-peer networks. In EC ’04, pages 102–111, New York, NY, USA,
2004. ACM.
3. Karen K. Fullam, Tomas B. Klos, Guillaume Muller, Jordi Sabater, Andreas
Schlosser, Zvi Topol, K. Suzanne Barber, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein, Laurent Ver-
couter, and Marco Voss. A specification of the agent reputation and trust (art)
testbed: experimentation and competition for trust in agent societies. In AAMAS
’05, pages 512–518, New York, NY, USA, 2005. ACM.
4. Trung Dong Huynh, Nicholas R. Jennings, and Nigel R. Shadbolt. An integrated
trust and reputation model for open multi-agent systems. Autonomous Agents and
Multi-Agent Systems, 13(2):119–154, 2006.
5. Sirkka L. Jarvenpaa, Noam Tractinsky, and Michael Vitale. Consumer trust in an
internet store. Inf. Technol. and Management, 1(1-2):45–71, 2000.
6. S. Marsh. Formalising trust as a computational concept, 1994.
7. Sarvapali D. Ramchurn, Dong Huynh, and Nicholas R. Jennings. Trust in multi-
agent systems. Knowl. Eng. Rev., 19(1):1–25, 2004.
8. Jordi Sabater and Carles Sierra. Regret: A reputation model for gregarious soci-
eties. In Fourth Workshop on Deception Fraud and Trust in Agent Societies, pages
61–70, 2001.
9. Jordi Sabater and Carles Sierra. Review on computational trust and reputation
models. Artif. Intell. Rev., 24(1):33–60, 2005.
10. Amirali Salehi-Abari and Tony White. Towards con-resistant trust models for dis-
tributed agent systems. In IJCAI ’09: Proceedings of the Twenty-first International
Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pages 272–277, 2009.
11. Michael Schillo, Petra Funk, and Michael Rovatsos. Using trust for detecting
deceitful agents in artificial societies. Applied Artificial Intelligence, Special Issue
on Trust, Deception and Fraud in Agent Societies, 14(8):825–848, September 2000.
12. W. T. Luke Teacy, Jigar Patel, Nicholas R. Jennings, and Michael Luck. Coping
with inaccurate reputation sources: experimental analysis of a probabilistic trust
model. In AAMAS ’05, pages 997–1004, New York, NY, USA, 2005. ACM.
13. Bin Yu, M.P. Singh, and K. Sycara. Developing trust in large-scale peer-to-peer
systems. Multi-Agent Security and Survivability, 2004 IEEE First Symposium on,
pages 1–10, 30-31 Aug. 2004.
14. Bin Yu and Munindar P. Singh. A social mechanism of reputation management in
electronic communities. In CIA ’00, pages 154–165. Springer-Verlag, 2000.
15. Bin Yu and Munindar P. Singh. Detecting deception in reputation management.
In AAMAS ’03, pages 73–80, New York, NY, USA, 2003. ACM.
